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THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 


BY 

ANSON PHELPS STOKES 

Secretary of Yale University 


Reprinted from The Yale Review , January, 1916 
[Copyright by the Yale Publishing Association, New Haven, Conn.] 



.S82 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
By Anson Phelps Stokes 

A T the present moment the advocates of Preparedness 
l have undoubtedly captured the American press. 
Whether they have been equally successful with the Ameri¬ 
can people remains to be seen. The writer, although finding 
many things to commend in the defense propaganda and 
some things to criticise in the point of view of extreme peace 
men, is none the less convinced that one of the gravest 
dangers facing the country is that we should be swept sud¬ 
denly into the competitive armament race which has brought 
Europe to the verge of ruin. It is a time for calm judgment 
and wise action, not for radical changes in policy either on 
the side of increasing or limiting the size of military and 
naval forces. There seems, therefore, no reason why the 
task should not be attempted of testing the validity of the 
claims of Preparedness, and of calling attention to certain 
fallacies of some of its advocates. It is the function of 
the trained soldier to devise and carry out military plans, 
but it is the duty of all intelligent citizens, through the 
creation of public opinion which will be reflected in Con¬ 
gress, to help determine what the major lines of national 
development shall be. As in most other matters, the layman 
must decide on the fundamental national policies that are 
advisable, and then leave it to the expert to execute them 
with the greatest efficiency. 

In preparedness there is only good; in Preparedness both 
good and bad. The former is merely a general term long in 
use, and meaning “the state or condition of being prepared,” 
its application depending entirely upon the conditions of its 
use. The latter is the summing up in a single word of a 
definite political movement of large significance. The dif- 


16 


242 


THE YALE REVIEW 


ference may be compared to that between the word conserva¬ 
tion written with a small c and a large C, or prohibition 
written with a small p and a large P. In each of these three 
cases a generic word of long history has suddenly been seized 
upon by a group of men to advance some specific ideal of 
national scope, which they have exalted to a position of 
dominant importance and at the same time restricted in 
meaning within narrow limits. 

There are many organizations in America advocating Pre¬ 
paredness from different angles. Among the most impor¬ 
tant are the Army League, Navy League, and National 
Security League. These all believe in cultivating the mili¬ 
tary virtues, and in developing powerful armaments, on the 
theory that the nation’s surest defense is in reliance on 
physical force and technical military equipment and skill. 
These societies and others like them—all carrying cn a 
vigorous propaganda—differ in details of emphasis, but 
unite in the “Conference Committee on National Prepared¬ 
ness” on the common platform “that our navy and military 
establishments are at present wholly inadequate to insure our 
security against foreign invasion.” When studied in more 
detail, the following three convictions emerge as conspicuous 
in their literature: (1) that the United States is in serious 
danger of an attack by one of the other great powers; (2) 
that to prevent a successful attack an immediate and very 
large increase in our military and naval establishments is 
necessary; (3) that Pacifism is a snare and delusion, and 
that its advocates in opposing Preparedness are to be dis¬ 
missed as well-meaning but dangerous cranks. 

In the sense in which these two opposite terms—Pre¬ 
paredness and Pacifism (or Pacificism)—are generally used, 
they may be considered new words. The first use of 
the former as indicating a definite politico-military propa¬ 
ganda is very recent, although Macaulay in 1849 refers to 
London during the riots of 1688 as wearing “a face of stern 
preparedness which might well have daunted a real enemy, 




The ISJbite House. 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 243 


if such an enemy had been approaching”; while the word 
Pacifism, which may be defined as the theory that disputes 
between civilized nations should be and can be settled with¬ 
out recourse to arms, does not appear in Murray, Webster, 
or any other standard dictionary. Both theories may pro¬ 
perly be called “ideals.” Extremists on each side do not 
like to accept this word for the view of their opponents, yet 
many of the advocates of Preparedness are almost as earnest 
in their desire to maintain peace as the members of a peace 
society. It is in the method rather than the goal that they 
differ. 

There is to-day hardly a high-school boy in America who 
does not know just what Preparedness means. Its advocates 
have carried on a remarkable campaign of publicity; and a 
programme, not heretofore broadly adopted in this country 
outside the circle of direct army and navy influence, has now, 
through the effective presentation of certain lessons based on 
conclusions drawn from the European war, suddenly become 
the embodiment of an important national movement. To be 
sure, it is proclaimed much more on the two seaboards than 
in the Middle West and South, and more in the cities than 
in the country; yet it may be said to share with Prohibition 
the centre of the political stage. And it is interesting to 
note that, as a general rule, where one is strong the other is 
weak. It is not an accident that metropolitan and cosmo¬ 
politan Mr. Roosevelt should be the most vociferous advocate 
of one ideal, and agricultural, Chautauquan Mr. Bryan of the 
other. It w r ould not be politically illogical to find one of our 
great parties making Protection and Preparedness its slogan 
at the next election, a second standing for Prohibition and 
Pacifism—and the third, now in power, preferring a via 
media between Conservatism and Radicalism. At any rate, 
the party line-up will be largely on the attitude towards 
Preparedness—with “the interests,” right or wrong, and 
strongly supported by the manufacturers of war materials, 
mainly for it, and the masses, right or wrong, fearing that 


244 


THE YALE REVIEW 


it may yield to militarism, mainly against it. If our diagno¬ 
sis of the decisive part which this discussion is destined to 
play in the politics of this coming year of a presidential elec¬ 
tion is true—and President Wilson’s Manhattan Club speech 
brings it into the forefront,—it behooves every citizen to 
understand this new doctrine and to weigh carefully the 
arguments for and against it. 


I 

The first plank in the platform of Preparedness as already 
defined is the conviction that the United States is in serious 
danger of an attack by one of the other great powers. This 
is shown in countless articles in the press under such titles as 
“The Writing on the Wall,” “The Next War,” “The Sub¬ 
jugation of America,” “The Battle of the Connecticut,” 
“Arm or Surrender.” The argument generally begins with 
a vivid picture of the sufferings of Belgium, overrun because 
of her “unpreparedness,” calls attention to the predatory 
tendencies of certain nations (the “United States stands 
unprotected amid a gang of calculating international rob¬ 
bers”), refers to the probability of grave disputes with this 
country because of our large foreign population, and gener¬ 
ally ends with the statement that the only way for the con¬ 
quered side in the War of Ten Nations to recoup will be for 
it to threaten our seaboard cities and hold them by the throat 
for a colossal ransom. 

So let us examine carefully the likelihood of an invasion 
by various nations, for it is only by being comprehen¬ 
sively specific that we can expose groundless fears. The 
only nations that could conceivably attack the United States 
during the next quarter of a century with any measure of 
success would be England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, 
Japan, or China. Now, all but a few extremists who wish “a 
predominant navy” rule out England from their considera¬ 
tion. The one hundred years of peace on our unprotected 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 245 


northern boundary, the confidence in the political ideals of 
twentieth-century Englishmen, and the general feeling that 
“blood is thicker than water’’ lead them to rest satisfied with 
protection against the second largest fleet. England’s atti¬ 
tude in case of a war between Germany and the United 
States is dealt with later. 

Furthermore, I have yet to read any prediction of an 
attack by France—a democracy bound to us by the closest 
political ties. It has a decreasing birth rate, a large colonial 
empire, and no national aggressiveness except its natural 
desire to regain the lost provinces along the Rhine. Italy 
has no imperial ambitions outside the Mediterranean area. 
Not even a Bernhardi has conceived of her invading America. 
Russia is nowhere within striking distance of our coast 
except for Alaska, and even this non-contiguous territory is 
about the width of the north Atlantic from the nearest Rus¬ 
sian port—Vladivostok. Furthermore, her ambitions centre 
in Asia and European Turkey. China’s lack of effective 
unity, her small navy and merchant marine, her inadequate 
financial resources, and her total want of national aggressive¬ 
ness make her out of the question as a possible attacking 
enemy in this generation. 

And so we ask, “Who is the enemy that seriously threatens 
us?” The prophecy of disaster by one of the leading defense 
societies in a recent circular, “should even a second or 
third rate foreign power take a notion to invade us,” is 
absurd. It remains to consider Japan and Germany—two 
powerful nations with military traditions. 

That there is a chance of trouble on our western seaboard 
because of the Japanese cannot be doubted, but the remedy 
is entirely in the hands of our own people. The Japanese 
government by undertaking to check all emigration of 
Japanese workingmen to this country, by its generous 
cooperation in the San Francisco Exposition, by its conspicu¬ 
ously friendly attitude towards various American commis¬ 
sions visiting Japan, and in other ways, has shown its desire 


246 


THE YALE REVIEW 


to improve relations with this country. We can dismiss all 
thought of an attack by Japan if we will treat the Japanese, 
who are a sensitive and proud people, courteously and fairly, 
adopting immigration and land tenure laws that apply alike 
to all foreigners. Even if the Pacific coast refuses to be 
reasonable in this matter, our danger is more a loss of moral 
respect among other nations than war brought on by Japan. 
A friend who returned two years ago from an extended trip 
in the Orient tells me that in the Philippines and elsewhere 
he talked with scores of army and navy officers and that all 
except one predicted war with the Mikado’s subjects within 
six months, but the war has not come. Over four thousand 
miles of ocean, a strong naval base in Hawaii, the far 
superior American navy, and a coast line with few harbors— 
the most important of these well protected—do not make an 
attack on our coast likely, especially now that Korea and 
Formosa give Japan ample scope for colonization, that she 
is allied with friendly England, and that the Panama Canal 
increases by at least fifty per cent the defensive power of 
our fleet. Japan knows that her sphere of influence is 
Asiatic not American. She could not turn to any profitable 
account a square foot of our continental territory. 

A single nation remains to be considered as a possible 
invader—Germany. It is undoubtedly fear of her that has 
secured for the Preparedness propaganda such lively atten¬ 
tion. One of her strategists—Freiherr von Edelsheim— 
has written a book trying to prove that she could begin the 
invasion of this country with several hundred thousand 
troops four weeks after the beginning of hostile operations. 
But what of it? What evidence have we that Germany will 
ever contemplate such a move? And if the German fleet 
appeared off our coast, would the American navy, almost its 
equal in tonnage, do nothing to prevent its landing? The 
magazine writers seem to forget that we have any navy in 
being or construction when they calmly assume that “the 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 247 


vulnerable heart” of America could be easily captured by a 
German attack. 

But we have no present reason to suppose that Germany 
plans such a foolish and wicked act. At the end of the 
war she will be in one of three positions—victor, vanquished, 
or tied. If victorious (a result which, if it assumes the 
destruction of the British fleet, I cannot believe to be pos¬ 
sible), her desire for territorial expansion and her pride will 
be satisfied; if vanquished, a depleted treasury and a weary 
nation will not permit so large an undertaking; if the war is 
a draw, it will be only because of exhaustion—for nothing 
else will bring Germany to terms—and a state of exhaustion 
is not conducive to a colossal new undertaking. And we 
must not forget the inevitable rise of the Social Democracy 
in Germany; and democratic control of government, as 
Kant pointed out in his great essay on peace over a century 
ago, is the surest bulwark against an aggressive war. The 
fact that her present allies—Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and 
Bulgaria—would have nothing to gain from an American 
struggle, should also not be overlooked. 

Furthermore, there are signs of the development in Ger¬ 
many of a chastened and more reasonable spirit even in circles 
close to the government. These, overcome by the fear of 
Russian invasion, kept silent during the opening weeks of 
the war, but now they are being heard. The personal letters 
from German professors sound a more moderate note. The 
recent protest against annexation of conquered territory 
signed by Harnack, Dernburg, Zimmermann, and many other 
men equally influential is symptomatic. So is “F Accuse.” 
These are straws all pointing to independence of judgment 
among German leaders, to the rise of a higher sense of inter¬ 
national morality, and to a determination that the views'of 
military men shall not dominate completely the foreign 
policy of the nation. But the advocates of Preparedness 
claim that the financial situation will be so desperate that the 


248 


THE YALE REVIEW 


lure of American gold will be irresistible. Rather will one 
great failure, in the state of public opinion and with a possible 
revolution at home, make caution rule before embarking the 
several hundred thousand men needed on a risky expedition, 
which could not possibly be accomplished without serious loss 
to the navy and to the merchant marine,—on which Germany 
will have to depend more than ever for restoring her fortunes. 

If the United States gets into war and is attacked, it is 
much more likely to be the result of Congress being unduly 
influenced by the Jingoism of the yellow press, than because 
Germany or any other country wants to invade us. In fact 
the permanent defeat of American Jingoism would be a surer 
guarantee of peace than the victory of Preparedness. The 
former would help remove one of the most potential causes 
of war; the latter, unless accompanied by a restrained and 
chastened spirit at home, would tend to encourage forces 
that would in due time be glad to give demonstration of 
our prowess in battle. The fact is that we have forgotten 
our fortunate isolation, and have applied analogies drawn 
from the experience of contiguous European states that have 
no bearing on our problem. That Germany, to the lasting 
dishonor of her government, tried to attack her hereditary 
enemy France over about one hundred miles of the com¬ 
bined Belgian and Luxemburg boundaries, is no reason 
why we should expect her to attack an old friend, nearly 
one-tenth of whose population is sprung from her loins, with 
3,500 miles of sea between us, and with our coast line extend¬ 
ing over twenty degrees of latitude. No, the fear that 
Germany will attempt to invade the United States is mainly 
due to the illusion of military men that wars between power¬ 
ful civilized nations must continue to be inevitable. But 
why should we accept the opinions of colonels arid rear 
admirals as the last word on this subject? They know 
much more about European military establishments than 
laymen, but are not apt to be so impartial in judging politi- 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 249 


cal probabilities, as they live in an atmosphere charged with 
international suspicions. They rightly feel that the protec¬ 
tion and honor of the country is in their hands, and it is not 
surprising that they should be constantly on the lookout for 
possible enemies and should consequently exaggerate their 
power and evil intentions. 


II 

Granting for the moment that the altogether unlikely 
attempt is made by Germany to invade the United States, let 
us consider dispassionately some of the probable obstacles in 
her path overlooked by most of the vociferous champions of 
Preparedness. That foreign troops, backed by a large navy, 
could under certain conditions be landed on our shores cannot 
be doubted, but the alarmists forget or underestimate three 
important factors which we shall consider with reference to 
Germany, conceded to be the most likely enemy. These are: 

(1) that Germany, in the tense European situation which will 
continue for many years, would not dare allow the major 
portion of her navy to be away from home waters or 
endanger her merchant marine for transportation purposes; 

(2) that the American navy is to-day nearly if not fully 
the equal of that of Germany, and is not clearly outclassed 
by any fleet except that of England; (3) that to transport 
successfully to America the invading army of 400,000 men 
as proposed by Eric Wood, or of 240,000 infantry with the 
necessary complements from the other arms of the service, 
as deemed necessary by General Greene, would involve many 
difficulties, including the passing of England on an aggres¬ 
sive mission, the destruction of the American fleet, and the 
overcoming of our coast defenses and of our small but 
efficient army. The general staff’s plans are believed to have 
called for the capture of Paris by the Germans within 
three weeks from the date of the declaration of war. Our 


250 


THE YALE REVIEW 


Preparedness friends give about the same time for the cap¬ 
ture of New York by the German fleet. Perhaps they, too, 
will prove to be mistaken. 

If it is possible to predict the future in any way by the past, 
Germany will continue to support “armed peace” on the 
theory that thus alone can she protect herself from near-by 
neighbors anxious to jump at her throat—France and 
Russia—and from suspected intrigues of her great politi¬ 
cal and trade rival, England. The bitterness which this war 
will engender between clearly defined European nationalities 
with long inherited prejudices can hardly be overestimated. 
In this respect the relatively quick healing of the wounds 
after our Civil War cannot be considered a precedent—for 
here there was a return to the dominant unities of race, reli¬ 
gion, and political history. But even in our own land it took 
a full generation—a third of a century—before North and 
South were fully fused by the experience of the Spanish 
War, while the bitterness of the Franco-Prussian War of the 
’seventies had not died out when the War of Ten Nations 
came forty years later. In a word, mutual suspicion and 
dissatisfaction with the terms of peace will continue, at 
least on one side; and neither Germany nor any other 
European country, especially after the startling suddenness 
with which the present war came on, would be willing to 
allow a fleet large enough to put the American navy out 
of commission—which would mean most of its naval fighting 
force—to leave home waters. The risk of attack at home, 
or more strictly the fear of such attack, would be too great, 
and the danger of losing the flower of the depleted merchant 
marine—needed for the trade war against England—would 
be too serious. This inability or unwillingness during the 
continuance of the European strain to detach from her coast 
a naval fleet sufficient to cope with a powerful enemy navy, 
would be the first serious obstacle Germany would encounter 
in case she wished to attack the United States. 

But granting for the moment that Germany would be 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 251 


willing to allow the major portion of her fleet to leave 
European waters, what are we to think of England’s atti¬ 
tude? She has and will have no desire for European expan¬ 
sion; so to get the bulk of the German fleet out of the North 
Sea for a few weeks would hold out to her no temptations 
of attack. On the other hand, would England calmly allow 
400,000 soldiers, guarded by a large navy, to pass quietly 
down the English Channel with the definite object of invad¬ 
ing North American territory? We are not to forget that 
her possessions in this continent are more extensive than our 
own, being about 3,729,000 square miles as compared with 
our 3,616,000, and that the preservation of some form of 
the Monroe Doctrine, at least as it applies to the West Indies 
and North and Central America, is almost as vital to her as 
to us. She would view the acquisition by Germany of a 
coaling station in the West Indies with as much suspicion 
and distrust as would the United States. One German 
strategist of the proposed American invasion assumes the 
necessity of a naval base controlled by Germany in proximity 
to our coast, which could be used as a coaling station, and 
calmly suggests that this could be taken from England. But 
what would England say of such an act of piracy? Her 
Canadian interests would not permit Germany’s becoming an 
important factor in North America, while the strong friend¬ 
ship which has developed between the two kindred countries 
would serve as a deterrent to allowing German aggression 
here. For our opponents to say that America did not actu¬ 
ally join the Allies in the present conflict after England had 
declared war on Germany and that consequently the former 
would not join the United States in another war provoked 
by Germany is beside the mark, for America has no colonial 
interests to protect in Europe, while England’s colonial inter¬ 
ests in America are enormous. If we give our Preparedness 
friends the benefit of the doubt, we must assume that they 
are right in disclaiming American military aggressiveness 
and in believing that our only war with Germany would be 


252 


THE YALE REVIEW 


a defensive one. In such a war in the next quarter-century, 
it is almost inconceivable that England would join Germany 
against us. She might become our ally; she would at least 
assume towards us an attitude of benevolent neutrality. In 
making this prediction it must be remembered that in the 
opinion of many of the most responsible English statesmen 
the United States has actually aided the Allies more in the 
present war by remaining officially neutral, and thus allowing 
ammunition to go in large quantities to them, than by joining 
the Allies and consequently reducing the exportation of 
arms, especially as the assistance that our small army could 
give in a European war that is mainly on land would be 
trifling. 

But assuming for the sake of argument that Germany 
does decide to attack the United States and that England is 
friendly to her purposes, or at least neutral, would the land¬ 
ing on the coast of the United States be as easy as the friends 
of Preparedness believe? It is an astonishing fact that in 
almost every discussion of the invasion of our country by 
Germany it is taken for granted that the American fleet is 
put out of existence. The accounts of the invasion do not 
begin with the difficulties to be met when the Germans sail 
from Hamburg and Bremen, but merely when they begin 
their land operations in this country; but what of our forty 
battleships, each of from ten to thirty thousand tons dis¬ 
placement and costing from nearly five to eight million 
dollars, of which ten are dreadnaughts, and of our sixty 
destroyers, and ten armored cruisers, and the other vessels 
of a fleet which cost to construct and arm over $400,000,000! 
Our navy is now being systematically underestimated by the 
friends of Preparedness in the hope that they may frighten 
the American people into authorizing gigantic new expendi¬ 
tures, although more vessels of importance are at present 
under construction than ever before in our history, and 
even according to one of the most zealous and best-informed 
of naval chroniclers, the navy’s size in “ships and men is 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 253 


just six times” what it was in 1898. Our fleet cannot be 
more than slightly inferior in size to that of Germany, while 
some naval officers have recently stated their conviction of 
its superiority. Would it do nothing to repel the invader? 
Are the traditions of the War of 1812 and the Civil War 
and the Spanish War entirely forgotten? We are spending 
at present nearly $150,000,000 annually on our navy, about 
twenty per cent more than was allowed Germany in the 
budget for 1914-15, and yet it is taken for granted that 
this expenditure will all prove of no avail. These sums were 
the largest in the history of either country before this war; 
but the proportion of outlay in favor of the United States 
was a matter of long standing. The tables in “The States¬ 
man’s Year Book” show that for the four years preceding 
1914—even in her feverish yearning to be a match for Eng¬ 
land on the sea—Germany’s expenditures for the navy had 
never reached the figure of £25,000,000, while America’s had 
each year exceeded this. One would suppose that such enor¬ 
mous expenditures would carry with them at least some meas¬ 
ure of defensive protection, especially as it is conceded that to 
invade the United States, Germany would first be obliged to 
make our fleet of no avail. It will probably be answered 
that Germany’s complement of men and supply of ammuni¬ 
tion exceed our own. This is doubtless true, but the per¬ 
sonnel of her navy was only about 10,000 greater than ours 
when the war broke out, and our supply of war material 
is “nearly sufficient,” according even to Mr. Neeser, one of 
the most strenuous advocates of a larger navy. Defects there 
are both in equipment, and, more especially, in adminis¬ 
tration; but these can be remedied without entering now 
upon a radical programme of super-dreadnaught construc¬ 
tion, while important public works in the interest of main¬ 
taining peace, such as the supplying of suitable and dignified 
embassies and legations abroad, are passed over as too 
expensive. 

At the time that the Panama Canal was built, one of the 


254 


THE YALE REVIEW 


strongest arguments for it was that it would “double the 
American navy,” making it possible for the Atlantic fleet 
to be quickly transferred to the Pacific or vice versa. Mr. 
Taft five years ago, in advocating the two-battleship-a-year 
programme, definitely stated that this was necessary at least 
until the Panama Canal “doubled” our resisting power; but 
now it is completed, and the demand is for four battleships 
instead of two. Furthermore, this war has shown the power 
of the submarine. As compared with the battleship, it costs 
little and can be quickly built; so the recent decision to 
strengthen this arm of the service, already including seventy- 
five boats built, building, or authorized—more than double 
the total number in commission in Germany when the war 
broke out—has received general commendation, as has also 
the decision to strengthen our aviation corps, so invaluable 
for scouting purposes. 

We should like to put this question to the advocates of 
Preparedness who talk of our northeastern States becom¬ 
ing a second Belgium: What would the American navy, 
with over one hundred ships of war built or building (exclud¬ 
ing gunboats, torpedo boats, submarines, ordinary cruisers, 
and miscellaneous auxiliaries), and 8,250 authorized officers 
and 51,500 enlisted men, be doing while the German army 
was being calmly transported and landed on our coast? 
Former Secretary of the Navy Bonaparte states that “if 
Germany should declare war against us, she could immedi¬ 
ately bottle up our fleet by an overwhelmingly superior 
force”; but he does not give any reason for this sweeping 
statement. The simple fact of the matter is that the ships 
of the American navy in existence, or which would naturally 
be constructed in following out a well-conceived building 
policy, without any sudden and enormous enlargement of 
expenditures, and with full appreciation by naval officers of 
the lessons of the war, should be adequate to meet any Ger¬ 
man fleet which is likely to attack us in the near future. 

But let us go one step further and grant the three unlikely 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 255 


things which we have discussed—that Germany would try 
to invade the United States, that England would not inter¬ 
fere, and that our navy would be promptly bottled up or 
put out of existence—what about our coast and harbor 
defenses and coast artillery? Mr. Taft, with his long experi¬ 
ence as Secretary of War and President, says that ours are 
among the best defenses in the world. If they are not, no 
pacifist need have any objection to their being made stronger, 
for coast defenses cannot be used for aggression. We have 
expended $160,000,000 upon them in the past quarter of a 
century, and even von Edelsheim, with his contempt for our 
army, refers to the “excellent fortifications of the great 
American trade harbors.” As to their supply of ammuni¬ 
tion, laymen must not be deceived by the statement that 
they have only sufficient for one hour of continuous firing, 
for even the “experts” ask for only a two hours’ supply! 
The coast artillery, consisting of about 18,000 men, is under¬ 
manned but highly efficient. At the outbreak of hostilities it 
would be supported by a body of 100,000 soldiers—25,000 
detached as mobile troops from the regular army and 75,000 
from the best trained militia—and with our coast defenses 
and railroads these should be at least able to aid in repelling 
the invader before he had secured an adequate foothold. Yet 
we freely grant that our armed land forces are at present so 
small and our system of reserves so inadequate, that from 
a military standpoint it is on the fleet that we must mainly 
depend for safety in the remote contingency of an attack. 

But this inadequacy of our army does not mean that we 
should embark on a policy of enormously increased military 
expenditures owing to the fear bred of the present war. 
Former Secretary of War Stimson—one of the best equipped 
of the Preparedness leaders—stated not long ago that “prac¬ 
tically all authorities agree that this amount of money [that 
is, the $240,000,000 now expended annually for national 
defense], if wisely spent, would be amply sufficient for the 
maintenance of a most adequate system of military and naval 


256 


THE YALE REVIEW 


defense.” That is the gist of the matter. What we need 
now is a better system, rather than more money spent on the 
army, which actually costs about twenty times as much a year 
per available soldier as the army of Switzerland, with its 
short periods of annual training and long service in the 
reserves. The Elite and Landwehr, totalling 214,000 men, 
cost Switzerland, together with all military expenses, less 
than $9,000,000 annually, as compared with the estimate for 
this year of $105,937,544.26 for our small military establish¬ 
ment which is limited by law to 104,569 men. By adopting 
some features of the Swiss system, greater efficiency, a 
largely increased force, and a higher morale could be secured 
without spending another dollar. The shortening of the 
years spent by regulars “with the colors” and the lengthen¬ 
ing of the period with the reserves, instead of the present 
uneconomical plan of seven-year enlistments, of which the 
last three are “on furlough”; the development of the excel¬ 
lent and democratic plan of General Wood for the largely 
self-supporting officers’ training-camps such as the success¬ 
ful one at Plattsburg; the saving of $5,507,000 annually, 
according to War Department estimates, by concentrating 
our mobile army in eight posts instead of forty-nine, greatly 
increasing thereby its experience in working with large 
units; and the increase of Federal supervision over the state 
militia—these are among the wise ways in which our army 
could be strengthened to meet an attack which had pierced 
our first line of defense—the navy. Such re-organization 
can and should be carried out by Congress acting on the 
advice of the Secretary of War; and it is a good by-product 
of the Preparedness propaganda that it has helped to point 
the way to it—but it calls for no excitement, no frantic 
appeals, no extravagant increases of expenditures, no radical 
departure from the historic military policy of the nation, 
which is opposed to a large standing army. The same holds 
true with reference to the navy, where it would be inadvisable 
to determine the lines of a long building programme before 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 257 


the lessons of the war as they affect naval construction have 
been mastered. It is a time for attention to intensive rather 
than extensive work in both War and Navy Departments. 
The great need is for more statesmanlike planning and 
courage rather than for more millions. 

We have tried to deal with the first two claims of the 
Preparedness advocates: first, that Germany is likely to 
attempt an invasion; and second, that her invasion would be 
as irresistible as her march through Belgium. 

Ill 

We come now to the third basis common to most of the 
leaders of this movement—abuse of pacifism in almost every 
form, and belief that its advocates in opposing Preparedness 
are well-meaning but dangerous cranks. Why are pacifists 
and peace societies singled out for such abuse? What 
nefarious, unpatriotic task engages their attention? Accord¬ 
ing to a writer in a prominent military journal, a pacifist 
“is essentially and always pestiferous and cantankerous.” 
Mr. Roosevelt in his recent book, “America and the World 
War,” almost exhausts the English language in his denun¬ 
ciation of what he calls “ultra pacifists.” They are “a 
feeble folk morally and physically,” “well-meaning men of 
weak mind,” or “men of strong but twisted mind.” He 
declares that “the professional pacifists, taken as a class,” 
have done “less than nothing for the forward movement of 
mankind.” Peace congresses of the past twenty years have 
not “accomplished the smallest particle of good”; and as 
for all-inclusive peace treaties, such as those advocated by 
Mr. Taft, or carried through by the present Administration, 
they are merely “unspeakable silliness”—as in fact is any 
international agreement or policy not backed up by an 
invincible army and navy. In a word, he opposes pacifists 
because they don’t believe in brandishing the Big Stick. 
These quotations are sufficient to indicate the attitude 


17 


258 


THE YALE REVIEW 


of Preparedness towards Pacifism. Their relations are 
mutually unfriendly and to an almost equal degree. But 
let us allow the much abused pacifists to speak for themselves. 

The American Peace Society, which has had a hundred 
years of honorable history and is the oldest and most im¬ 
portant of our peace organizations, thus defines its aim in 
its constitution: 

The purpose of the American Peace Society is to promote permanent 
international peace, to educate and organize public opinion in opposition 
to war as a means of settling international differences, and to promote 
in every proper way the general use of conciliation, judicial methods, 
and other peaceful means of avoiding and adjusting such differences. 

Is there anything unpatriotic in such a purpose? The 
policy of the New York Peace Society and of kindred 
organizations is similarly defined. 

These quotations, which might be added to indefinitely, 
are sufficiently characteristic for our purpose. Again, we 
ask, “Why do such peaceful efforts receive such bitter denun¬ 
ciation ?” Why do our military friends—and they are 
many and admirable men too—resort even to the long dis¬ 
carded proof-text method of quoting Scripture in a hopeless 
attempt to try to prove that the founder of Christianity was 
an advocate of war? The reason is simple—all of the peace 
societies are opposed to any radical increase in military 
expenditures, and most of them oppose any increase what¬ 
soever. The American Peace and Arbitration League is 
an exception to the rule, its watchword being “adequate 
armament and effective arbitration.” But what is “adequate 
armament”? The only answer that will satisfy thorough¬ 
going and logical Preparedness men is armament suffi¬ 
cient to meet any reasonable combination of enemies. And 
so the greater the armaments of other nations, the greater 
must ours be; and the rivalry will go on until the crash 
comes. Dreadnaughts and ever more dreadnaughts is the 
cry, for such a thing as complete security against any 
invasion is impossible so long as naval forces that might 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 259 


be brought against us are superior to our own. President 
Wilson supports a programme for “hastening the pace” 
which will add about seventy per cent to our military 
expenses for the next five-year period, bringing them to the 
huge sum of about two billion dollars, exclusive of pensions; 
yet Mr. Roosevelt calls it a “shadow programme,” and joins 
other extreme Preparedness advocates in believing this “half¬ 
way” policy insufficient. The talk of a $500,000,000 bond 
issue for defense, and of a “preponderant navy” is new, 
but this is only a beginning. No wonder that Professor 
Sumner, with his cold logic, saw through and to the end of 
this w T hole business of preparing for war by trying to match 
the armaments of Europe. Here is the closing paragraph 
of his great essay on “War”: 

There is no state of readiness for war; the notion calls for never- 
ending sacrifices. It is a fallacy. It is evident that to pursue such a 
notion with any idea of realizing it would absorb all the resources and 
activity of the state; this the great European states are now proving 
by experiment. A wiser rule would be to make up your mind soberly 
what you want, peace or war, and then to get ready for what you want; 
for what we prepare for is what we shall get. 

That officers in the army and navy are for all the increases 
they can get is perfectly natural. They would be unlike 
most men in their keenness for professional advancement 
and for increasing the prestige of the career they represent 
if they were not. And the manufacturers of war materials— 
an industry growing by leaps and bounds in our country— 
very naturally follow suit, for otherwise many of their 
enormous new factories made to meet the needs of the Euro¬ 
pean war would have to shut down at its close. And then 
other connected industries—brass, steel, copper, transporta¬ 
tion—join the procession. It is not surprising to be informed 
by a metropolitan daily that the National Association of 
Manufacturers has recently given the Security League 
“one of the strongest indorsements yet made by any board 
of directors.” Similarly in a recent account of the meeting 


260 


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of the National Founders Association, the main subject of 
discussion is expressed in the following sentence: “When 
the war is ended, American business will have to cope with 
the sudden displacement caused by the cessation of war 
orders, which will reduce profits in many lines.” This is 
undeniably true and it is not to be wondered at that manu¬ 
facturers in large numbers endorse the Preparedness move¬ 
ment, for it means enormous home orders and the continua¬ 
tion of present “profits.” But all this carries with it grave 
dangers of materialism. 

This partly explains the violent attacks against peace 
societies. They are opposed to large increases in armaments, 
while the followers of the Big Stick and of Big Business 
generally favor them. They are doubtless extreme at times 
in imputing unworthy motives to their opponents; they are 
not without some foolish people in their midst with quack 
nostrums for stopping the war; they may seem to lack a 
masculine and intelligent constructive programme, although 
the most interesting recent suggestion—the League of 
Peace—is largely the work of their adherents; they do not 
sometimes respond with keen sensitiveness to attacks on the 
nation’s honor;—but they hold up the banner of peace; they 
show the danger in a democracy of accepting the opinions of 
military men as final in matters of public policy; they oppose 
all international bitterness and hatred; they urge in season 
and out of season the principles of friendly diplomacy, media¬ 
tion, and arbitration as preventives of war; and they keep 
before the nation the idea of “the parliament of man and 
the federation of the world.” And for these services they 
should be thanked. President Hibben in his Lake Mohonk 
address speaks of “the lack of tolerance on the part of certain 
pacifists.” It is a just criticism, but this fault is at least 
equally characteristic of some officers of the army and navy 
who are unable to understand why most intelligent civilians 
in a democracy yearn for the coming of the day when, except 
for occasional constructive tasks like the building of the 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 261 

Panama Canal, the army will do only national police duty 
and the navy only national or international police duty. 

P acifists in common with most humanitarians are 
ashamed that after nineteen centuries of Christian civiliza¬ 
tion the world should be watching the greatest “war game” 
in history, in which the killing of innocent human beings is 
reduced to “a scientific proposition,” and they are working 
and praying that our nation may never be involved in such 
a cruel conflict. They dissent absolutely from the famous 
dictum of von Moltke that “perpetual peace is a dream, 
and not even a beautiful dream,” and from Nietzsche’s 
desire to turn the great beatitude into “Blessed are the war- 
makers.” They do not deny the meed of honor to the brave 
men who go fearlessly to death for a cause they believe just, 
they recognize a real though perverted idealism even in the 
armies of nations whose rulers have put them on the wrong 
side in the present conflict, and they are not unaware that 
war may purify a nation’s life, or rather what is left of its 
life; but they think of how tragically unnecessary it all is, 
and the ghost of the much proclaimed “armed peace” rises 
to haunt them. They remember that every increase in 
European armaments was carried through as a “defensive” 
measure. As Count von Bernstorff stated in an address in 
New York in 1910, “our armaments are intended to pre¬ 
serve peace for our own people.” This was doubtless an 
entirely sincere statement, just as the advocates of Pre¬ 
paredness believe that a much larger American navy would 
be used only for defense; but are they right? The experi¬ 
ence of Europe seems to prove that it is almost impossible 
to develop a great machine conducted by a highly trained, 
intensely patriotic, and professionally ambitious group of 
men, without running the risk of picking unnecessary 
quarrels with other nations. 

The leaders of advanced public opinion in this country are 
coming more and more to the conviction that the United 
States will never be justified in going to war with another 


262 


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well-organized and civilized nation except for defense, and 
that it can settle its other international disputes through fair¬ 
ness and courtesy, straightforward diplomacy (as in the 
case of the “Arabic’’ incident) and arbitration, and, when 
these fail, through withdrawal of diplomatic relations as a 
moral protest against wrongs committed, non-intercourse, 
embargo, and other forms of effective economic pressure. 
There are more satisfactory ways of securing reparation 
for insults to the nation’s flag or for destruction of American 
property by a foreign mob than a threat of war. The 
only consideration of offense, therefore, which we should 
permit our military leaders to bear in mind in making their 
plans, is such as is incidental to the best defense. Unfor¬ 
tunately the Hague Court is under a temporary cloud 
created by the school of Treitschke and Bernhardi, but it 
will surely emerge and become a powerful factor in wisely 
settling disputes between nations, leading to a Permanent 
High Court of Justice, with probably some agreement for 
the enforcement of its decrees by an international force. 
Those who think this statement exaggerated, and who 
minimize the power of arbitration in international disputes, 
would do well to read the weighty words of Professor James 
Brown Scott, one of America’s most eminent authorities in 
international law, spoken in 1911: “The history of the past 
century and more shows that the good faith of nations is 
sufficient to insure compliance with an international award. 
Indeed there is no clear example of a refusal to abide by the 
terms of an award, however burdensome or galling they may 
appear to be.” That was written before the invasion of 
Belgium—a breach of a treaty, not of an arbitration award; 
but it is an impressive statement of the success of arbitration, 
of which our own nation has had encouraging experiences 
in the case of such vital issues as the Alabama Claims and 
the Sea Fisheries. 

But Preparedness of the radical kind is not only unneces¬ 
sary, it is positively dangerous. It will increase suspicion 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 263 


abroad, encourage the already threatening materialism at 
home, strengthen the hands of Continental militarists (for 
every increase in our navy means a corresponding increase in 
that of certain other powers), weaken our influence in 
developing the Hague Court, lessen our reputation as a 
nation for leadership in high international ideals, and 
destroy the last hope in this generation of taking the first 
steps towards disarmament. 

To oppose its programme of military expansion requires 
an equally determined and widespread effort which shall be 
constructive in character. The peace movement must em¬ 
phasize good will, not suspicion, among nations. It must 
stand for the strengthening of our diplomatic service and 
for its removal from all petty partisan politics. It might 
urge that, following the precedent of the navy, our War 
Department become an Army Department, and our Secre¬ 
tary of War a Secretary of the Army. This would show a 
right change in emphasis. It should demand that the manu¬ 
facture of munitions of war for the United States—other 
than types of arms and ammunition also used in non-military 
trades or occupations—be removed from the sphere of 
profit-making, where it is apt to encourage war, and that it 
be taken over by the Government, as in the Springfield 
Arsenal. It should advocate at the earliest appropriate time 
a third Hague conference. It should try to remove all 
causes of friction between the United States and other 
powers, especially by extending the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Government—giving it power to enforce treaty 
rights in the States, and perhaps to deal sternly with the 
red head-line writers in their attempt to make financial 
capital out of international difficulties. In a word, it should 
rely largely on the defensive power of a wiser statesmanship 
and of a broader humanitarianism for the maintenance of 
peace. 

A prominent naval officer recently stated in an address in 
New York that the ideas “which spring up like weeds” 


264 


THE YALE REVIEW 


about the hopes of universal peace “tend to sap, strangle, 
and kill the national character.” This is a characteristic 
statement of those who honestly believe that war is the best 
training ground for the exercise of courage, manliness, and 
self-sacrifice. But what of exploration and the work of 
Dr. Grenfell’s Deep-Sea Mission, and the nation-wide 
struggle with drink and graft, and the reforming of Sing- 
Sing, and the building of the Panama Canal, and the open¬ 
ing of Alaska, and the attempt to re-create the life in the 
slums of our great cities, and the battle with tuberculosis, 
and the splendid crusade of picked men and women from 
our colleges who are trying to establish institutions of learn¬ 
ing on strong Christian foundations in China! These are 
merely stray examples of wonderful openings where all the 
martial virtues can be used in constructive work demanding 
a strenuous fight against “the world, the flesh, and the devil,” 
but not involving the needless killing of innocent men. We 
have made such activities of peace seem too “drab,” to use 
Percy MacKaye’s word in his suggestive “Substitute for 
War.” We must clothe them with more of the dynamic 
symbolism and pageantry of the heroic. 

That the Preparedness movement is accomplishing cer¬ 
tain incidental benefits to our nation cannot be doubted by 
any broad-minded man. It has called attention to our 
unsatisfactory enlistment laws and to our uneconomical plan 
of national defense, and rightly demands reforms of Con¬ 
gress. It has advocated the strengthening of the militia 
and the development of officers’ training camps. It encour¬ 
ages the American Legion in an important task which the 
Government should assume, of keeping in touch with former 
soldiers and sailors. It opposes congressional interference 
for local political purposes with the administration of the 
army and navy. It has shown the absurdity of the old 
theory that an effective army can be raised in a day, and 
emphasizes the importance of well-trained reserves. It holds 


THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 265 


up the ideal that every citizen should be ready and willing 
to render service to the state for its defense, and shows the 
educational value of military training as a discipline among 
our heterogeneous population. It calls for a study of the 
systems of Switzerland and of Australia, which have proved 
themselves well adapted to other democratic countries and 
which are certainly worthy of study, even if it should be 
decided not to adopt them or anything like them in this 
country. For these services the advocates of Preparedness 
deserve thanks. 

But on the other side of the ledger there is unfortunately 
a very serious debit statement. Preparedness exaggerates 
the danger of invasion, tending to put our people in a 
condition of stage fright; it fails to appreciate the changes 
that have come about in restricting the legitimate causes 
of war, and that will come about abroad after the present 
war in the more democratic control of foreign affairs; it is 
blind to the perils to our nation involved in entering the 
competitive race for armaments with European countries; 
it over-emphasizes some of the martial virtues and does not 
fully realize the opportunities for the development of the 
best of them off the field of battle; it takes inadequate 
cognizance of the force of public opinion, economic pressure, 
and non-intercourse as at least partial substitutes for war; 
it fails to appreciate the difficulties in raising taxes for the 
enormous new expenditures proposed, without creating wide¬ 
spread dissatisfaction; and it overlooks the insidious dangers 
in a democracy, where the directing heads in the executive 
and legislative departments are constantly changing, of hav¬ 
ing in Washington—the home par excellence for retired 
and furloughed officers—an increasingly powerful military 
group, supremely interested in enlarging and further 
enlarging our army and navy. 

This article cannot better be closed than with the impres¬ 
sive words of Lord Rosebery delivered on November 16, 
1915, in the Rhodes Lecture at the University of London: 


266 


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I know nothing more disheartening than the announcement recently 
made, that the United States—the one great country left in the world 
free from the hideous, bloody burden of war—is about to embark upon 
the building of a huge armada destined to be equal or second to our 
own. It means that the burden will continue upon the other nations and 
be increased exactly in proportion to the fleet of the United States. I 
confess that it is a disheartening prospect that the United States, so 
remote from the European conflict, should voluntarily in these days take 
up the burden, which, after this war, will be found to have broken, or 
almost broken, our backs. 

If the United States tries to frighten Europe by her arma¬ 
ments, her distrust of us and her misinterpreting of our 
motives will lead to deep suspicions and hatred—and these 
are the things that surely breed war. Knowing that 
“armed peace” has proved a sham and delusion in Europe, 
why should not our nation be willing to take risks for real 
peace in the interest of a world tired of the cruelties and 
horrors of war? A reputation for fair dealing will prove 
better and more lasting “insurance” against an unprovoked 
attack than any undue reliance upon monster implements 
of Mars, which are efficient for less than a score of years and 
then go to the scrap heap. Would that the word Prepared¬ 
ness might take on a new significance—that instead of being 
the doctrine of the mailed fist, which has wrought such havoc 
to civilization, it might become the ideal of those who wish to 
prepare this nation through a more enlightened citizenship 
to keep bright the torch of “peace, good will towards men” 
both at home and among the stricken peoples of Europe. 


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